|
VIRTUE ETHICS
Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). The origins of this theory date at least back to Plato and Aristotle (its roots in Chinese philosophy are even more ancient). Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take the form known as "neo-Aristotelian", almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it.These are arete (excellence or virtue) phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing.)
Virtue ethics contrasted with other ethical systems
The methods of virtue ethics are in contrast to the dominant methods in ethical philosophy, which focus on actions. For example, both deontological ethics and consequentialist systems try to provide guiding principles for actions that allow a person to decide how to behave in any given situation.
Virtue ethics, by contrast, focuses on what makes a good person, rather than what makes a good action. As such it is often associated with a teleological ethical system - one that seeks to define the proper telos (goal or end) of the human person.
Historical origins and development
Like much of the Western tradition, virtue ethics seems to have originated in ancient Greek philosophy. Discussion of what were known as the Four Cardinal Virtues - prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance - can be found in Plato's Symposium. The virtues also figure prominently in Aristotle's moral theory (see below). The Greek idea of the virtues was later incorporated into Christian moral theology. During the scholastic period, the most comprehensive consideration of the virtues from a theological perspective was provided by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae and his Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. The idea of virtue also plays a prominent role in the moral philosophy of David Hume.
Virtue ethics has been a recurring theme of political philosophy in the emergence of classical liberalism or republicanism, particularly in the Scottish Enlightenment that was carried to the British North American colonies and influenced the Founders of the United States. An exemplar of this was George Washington, who summarized his moral philosophy in a few words said on the final day, September 17, 1787, of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Many of the participants were dissatisfied with the Constitution they had just drafted, and concerned about its prospects for adoption and success. Washington is reported to have said, "Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair. The event is in the hands of God." He was saying that we are not morally responsible for outcomes, which largely result from factors we cannot control, and that while it is virtuous to do one's duty, sometimes we have to venture into new territory, creating new duties for ourselves not previously established. When we do that, our guide is the good opinion of those we admire as virtuous, and that the most virtuous members of society provide the standards for making moral decisions, by their own virtuous examples.
Aristotle's theory of the virtues
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle categorized the virtues as moral and intellectual. Aristotle identified nine intellectual virtues, the most important of which were sophia (theoretical wisdom) and phronesis (practical wisdom). The moral virtues included prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Aristotle argued that each of the moral virtues was a mean (see Golden Mean) between two corresponding vices. For example, the virtue of courage is a mean between the two vices of cowardice and foolhardiness. Where cowardice is the disposition to act more fearfully than the situation deserves, and foolhardiness is the disposition to show too little fear for the situation, courage is the mean between the two: the disposition to show the amount of fear appropriate to the situation.
Achieving eudaimonia
To achieve eudaimonia one must live by what can be considered virtues such as justice, wisdom, courage, prudence and so forth. A virtue ethicist would argue that this is what all humans would rationally choose to live by. To help us achieve eudaimonia we must practice to be virtuous. This is why, for many virtue ethicists, such as Aristotle, eudaimon should only refer to older people as only they have enough practical experience of life. A person who is aware of the right virtues to live by but chooses not to do so suffers from akrasia or 'weakness of the will' according to Aristotle.
Virtue ethics outside the Western tradition
Non-Western moral and religious philosophies, such as Confucianism, also incorporate ideas that may appear similar to those developed by the ancient Greeks. Like ancient Greek ethics, Chinese ethical thought makes an explicit connection between virtue and statecraft. However, where the Greeks focused on the interior orientation of the soul, Confucianism's definition of virtue emphasizes interpersonal relations.
Contemporary virtue ethics
Although some Enlightenment philosophers (e.g. Hume) continued to emphasize the virtues, with the ascendancy of utilitarianism and deontology, virtue ethics moved to the margins of Western philosophy. The contemporary revival of virtue ethics is frequently traced to the philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe's 1958 essay, Modern Moral Philosophy and to Philippa Foot, who published a collection of essays in 1978 entitled Virtues and Vices. Since the 1980s, in works like After Virtue and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has made an effort to reconstruct a virtue-based ethics in dialogue with the problems of modern and postmodern thought. Following MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, American Methodist theologian, has also found the language of virtue quite helpful in his own project. More recently, Rosalind Hursthouse has published On Virtue Ethics and Roger Crisp and Michael Slote have edited a collection of important essays titled Virtue Ethics. Ayn Rand did not present a virtue ethic in her Objectivist ethics.
Aretaic turn
The aretaic turn is a movement in contemporary moral philosophy and ethics to emphasize character and human excellence or virtue, as opposed to moral rules or consequences. This movement has been extended to other disciplines, including epistemology, politics, and jurisprudence. Aretaic is from the Greek arete, meaning excellence or virtue. Aretaic thus means of or pertaining to virtue or excellence. In contemporary philosophy, aretaic approaches are those which focus on human excellence or virtue.
In moral philosophy, the phrase aretaic turn refers to the renewed emphasis on human excellence or virtue in moral theory and ethics. One important moment in the aretaic turn was the publication by the Oxford philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe of Modern Moral Philosophy, which criticized utilitarian and deontological approaches to moral theory and suggested a return to Aristotelean themes in moral philosophy. In the 1960s and 1970s, this led to the re-emergence of the ancient Greek ethical school of virtue ethics. Important work was done by Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, John McDowell, and others. Contemporary philosophers working on virtue ethics include Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote, and Christine Swanton. In 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' [Crisp and Slote 1997] Michael Stocker summarises the main aretaic criticisms of Deontological and Consequentionalist ethics.
The aretaic turn in moral philosophy is paralleled by analogous developments in other philosophical disciplines. These include epistemology, where a distinctive virtue epistemology has been developed by Linda Zagzebski and others. In political theory, there has been discussion of virtue politics, and in legal theory, there is a small but growing literature on virtue jurisprudence.
Aretaic approaches to morality, epistemology, and jurisprudence have been the subject of intense debates. One criticism that is frequently made focuses on the problem of guidance. How does the idea of virtuous moral actor, believer, or judge provide the guidance necessary for action, belief formation, or the decision of legal disputes?
Criticisms of virtue ethics
As with all other schools of ethical theory, there are objections to virtue ethics.
Some claim a problem with the theory is the difficulty of establishing the nature of the virtues. Different people, cultures and societies often have vastly different opinions on what constitutes a virtue. For example, many would have once considered a virtuous woman to be quiet, servile, and industrious. This conception of female virtue no longer holds true in many modern societies (see also cultural relativism). Proponents of virtue ethics sometimes respond to this objection by arguing that a central feature of a virtue is its universal applicability. In other words, any character trait defined as a virtue must reasonably be universally regarded as a virtue for all sentient beings. According to this view, it is inconsistent to claim for example servility as a female virtue, while at the same time not proposing it as a male one.
Other proponents of virtue ethics, notably Alasdair MacIntyre, respond to this objection by arguing that any account of the virtues must indeed be generated out of the community in which those virtues are to be practiced: the very word 'ethics' implies 'ethos'. That is to say that the virtues are, and necessarily must be, grounded in a particular time and place. What counts as virtue in fourth-century Athens would be a ludicrous guide to proper behaviour in twenty-first-century Toronto, and vice-versa. To take this view does not necessarily commit one to the argument that accounts of the virtues must therefore be static: moral activity-- that is, attempts to contemplate and practice the virtues-- can provide the cultural resources that allow people to change, albeit slowly, the ethos of their own societies. MacIntyre appears to take this position in his seminal work on virtue ethics, After Virtue. One might cite (though MacIntyre does not) the rapid emergence of abolitionist thought in the slave-holding societies of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world as an example of this sort of change: over a relatively short period of time, perhaps 1760 to 1800, in Britain, France, and British America, slave-holding, previously thought to be morally neutral or even virtuous, rapidly became seen as vicious among wide swathes of society. While the emergence of abolitionist thought derived from many sources, the work of David Brion Davis, among others, has established that one source was the rapid, internal evolution of moral theory among certain sectors of these societies, notably the Quakers.
Another objection to virtue ethics is that the school does not focus on what sorts of actions are morally permitted and which ones are not, but rather on what sort of qualities someone ought to foster in order to become a good person. In other words, while some virtue ethicists may not condemn, for example, murder as an inherently immoral or impermissible sort of action, they may argue that someone who commits a murder is severely lacking in several important virtues, such as compassion and fairness. Still, antagonists of the theory often object that this particular feature of the theory makes virtue ethics useless as a universal norm of acceptable conduct suitable as a base for legislation. Some virtue theorists concede to this point, but respond by opposing the very notion of legitimate legislative authority instead, effectively advocating some form of anarchism as the political ideal. Others argue that it is possible to base a judicial system on the moral notion of virtues rather than rules. Some virtue ethicists, like Phillipa Foot, might respond to this overall objection with the notion of a "bad act" also being an act characteristic of vice. That is to say that those acts which do not aim at virtue, or stray from virtue, would constitute our conception of "bad behavior". Although not all virtue ethicists agree to this notion, this is one way the virtue ethicist can re-introduce the concept of the "morally impermissible".
See also
Further reading
External links
|