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BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule is a case law-derived concept in Corporations law whereby a court will refuse to review the actions of a corporation's board of directors in managing the corporation unless there is some allegation of conduct that (1) violates (a) the directors' duty of care, (b) duty of loyalty, or (c) duty of good faith; or (2) that the decisions of the directors lacks a rational basis. Courts often analyze the rational basis requirement as part of the director's duty of good faith.
In effect, the business judgment rule creates a strong presumption in favor of the Board of Directors of a corporation, freeing its members from possible liability for decisions that result in harm to the corporation. In short, it exists so that a Board will not suffer legal action simply from a bad decision. As the Delaware Supreme Court has said, a court "will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment" (Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) if "the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."(Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))
The rationale for the rule is the recognition by courts that, in the inherently risky environment of business, Boards of Directors need to be free to take risks without a constant fear of lawsuits affecting their judgment.
The presumption raised by the Business Judgment Rule may be rebutted by the plaintiff. Typically, defensive actions that are: based on threats that are unreasonably perceived, unproportional to the perceived threat, or "cram a management alternative down shareholder's throats will successfully defeat presumption of the business judgment rule.
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